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Abstract — This paper explains conflict over technological process innovation in cultural
terms, drawing primarily on a case study of electric power distribution and strategies to
automate its operation.  The paper shows how different occupational cultures, “operators”
and “engineers,” use different mental models or cognitive representations of technology
that are adaptive to their particular work contexts, but give rise to conflicting evaluations
of technological innovation.  While these cultural groups may be motivated by a common
interest in the successful performance of the technical system, they value different sets of
criteria for system design and promising modifications.  Despite the apparent
contradiction, each perspective is internally consistent and rational.  The paper argues that
it is beneficial for management to consider these diverse perspectives carefully when
planning technological innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon for organizations to experience difficulties when implementing technological
process innovations.  New techniques for production or operation, aimed at increasing efficiency,
may fail to generate the anticipated savings in time or monetary terms, or the extent of their
implementation may fall short of the full potential.  In some cases, initially promising innovation
programs are abandoned altogether.  Often, the failure of such programs is not due to any
shortcoming of the physical devices or technical schemes employed, but rather to conflict and
lacking acceptance within the organization attempting to implement the change.  
The problem of innovation failure has been recognized in the literature [4], [42], [46],
[51], and numerous individual cases have been reported [5], [36], [56], [63], [65], [87].  Some
research points to the importance of employee motivation toward technological change [74] and
specifically identifies employee resistance as a significant reason for failed innovation [19] [51],
[55]. 
When resistance to process innovation occurs, it typically manifests along occupational
or cultural sub-groups within an organization.  Because such groups tend to have different goals
relating to their own performance and rewards within the organization, their varying degrees of
enthusiasm for innovation programs can often be related to competing interests in control,
authority, and recognition of skills.  This aspect of intra-organizational conflict has been
explored extensively in previous work [29], [38], [43] and perhaps most pointedly in the context
of labor process theory [12], [50].  Resistance to innovation has also been attributed to
information asymmetries between technology advocates and users [41], leading to
misunderstandings or disagreements about the expected benefits of innovations [51]. 
This research examines conflict over technological innovation from a point of view that
may be characterized as cultural.  It aims to explore the origins of different judgments of
technology in the area of cognitive phenomena, i.e., how people think about technology.  A
central claim is that when it comes to implementing innovations, occupational groups are not
motivated exclusively by self-interest, but also by their sense of what is good for the organization
or the technical system as a whole.  This sense is informed by a distinct mental model or mode of
reasoning about the system, which in turn is adaptive to a particular work context.  While each
model may be internally consistent and rational, different models yield different answers to
questions about specific innovations and their promise.  Thus, conflicting values and judgments
can arise not only from conflicting interests, but from differences of interpretation.  
Cultural or perceptual differences among organizational subgroups have been previously
identified and discussed [9], [32], [78], [85], [10], [11].  For instance, Van Maanen and Barley
[78] define occupational communities in terms of their associated work engagement, identity,
values, norms, and perspectives independent of organizational boundaries, and Boland and
Tenkasi [11] explore how multiple communities with specialized expertise can communicate
their perspectives to each other.  But, with few exceptions [21], [73], [88], little work has been
done on relating what is known about cultural groups to the problem of technological innovation.
The challenge, recognized by some organizational research [6], [7], [11], [14], [52], is to
examine process technologies from the perspectives of those choosing and using them.
The present work strives to illuminate conflict around technology adoption and
implementation by characterizing the diverse perspectives of the participants involved.  This
paper focuses on the case of two cultural groups, “operators” and “engineers,” within electric
utility companies.  It examines how their respective models or cognitive representations of
electric power systems give rise to conflicting evaluations of new automation technology for
power distribution systems.  The mechanism of dissensus uncovered here may well be
generalizable to other technical settings.
“Distribution automation” is a buzzword in the electric power industry today.  It refers to
a variety of techniques for increasing the speed and scope of operations through electronic,
computer-driven equipment in place of manual procedures.  Most utilities in the U.S. are
involved at some level in the process of evaluating their options in this area and, in many cases,
implementing them [15], [17], [22], [28], [34], [47], [66], [83].  As in other industries, the main
motivation for automating operation and control processes is to increase operational efficiency
and thereby achieve enhanced performance at lower cost.  But, as might be expected, not all
experiences with distribution automation to date have been successes.  Specifically, automation
schemes may remain limited in their application because of doubts as to their reliability or
practicality, resistance to utilizing the new technology, or even outright sabotage on the part of
some workers.  Typically in such scenarios, a division emerges between the groups labeled here
as “engineers” and “operators,” with the former holding a more optimistic and the latter a more
pessimistic view of automation. 
Rather than trying to determine who may be right or wrong under given circumstances,
this paper aims to explain the diverse perspectives functionally, recognizing the internal logic
and rationality of each position.  It begins by characterizing the two cultures in terms of their
relationship to the technology and the types of cognitive representations they tend to construct
and use.  It then examines the values and judgments arising from these models, and how they
apply to specific examples of distribution automation technologies.  The emphasis is on the
operator perspective because, from an academic standpoint, it is the more esoteric.  Finally, the
paper discusses some theoretical ramifications of this work and practical implications for
management, particularly with regard to possibilities for improved, constructive resolution of
conflicts surrounding technological innovation. 
II. METHOD
The core of the research reported here consists of interviews with employees of electric utility
companies, as well as some participant observation.  I conducted 56 interviews with 71
individuals in six utilities: three in California, one in New York, one in New Jersey, and one in
Germany.  They were selected primarily based on convenience and access, but they also
represented a satisfactory cross-section of the spectrum among U.S. utilities in terms of
commitment to and experience with distribution automation.  All of the U.S. utilities were
investor-owned.  
The people I spoke with included predominantly operators and engineers engaged with
distribution in various ways (e.g. planning, computer systems, design, analysis, and
management), as well as several “troublemen” who work in the field.  For the most part, I found
my informants through “snowball sampling” [11]. 
The interviews were semi-structured, focused, and non-directive [48], allowing
informants to introduce new issues and identify matters of interest and significance to them.  The
ability of questions to elicit unanticipated responses is crucial, because in this way the research
design allows for surprises and can alert the researcher to re-examine underlying premises and
assumptions [37].  The evaluation of responses was exclusively qualitative, not statistical.
A previous phase of this research entailed visits to one fossil-fuel and six nuclear power
plants, with two of these visits extending over several weeks [62].  Here, the emphasis was on
observing people at work, though dozens of similar interviews were also conducted.  In
generalizing some of my conclusions to other technical systems, I also draw on similar research
on U.S. Navy nuclear aircraft carriers and civilian air traffic control [40], [59], [60].
The theoretical foundation for the research methodology is given by principles of in-
depth case study in the Verstehen tradition [26], grounded theory [27], [45], [71], and thick
description [25], which uses ethnographic and interpretive methods [2], [35], [77] to study
culture as a frame that establishes mental attitudes and guides action.  This type of research is
inductive in nature, aiming at hypothesis development rather than hypothesis testing.
Constant comparative analysis, as used in the construction of grounded theory, provides a
way of dealing with the multiple realities encountered in a setting such as this, where both action
and discourse (i.e., accounts of actions by various actors) are important.  The goal is ultimately to
arrive at theories that are grounded in empirical observations and meaningful to the people
whose actions and accounts they explain, rather than derived from abstract categories that are
superimposed on the reality of the setting in the hope of finding some agreement.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL SUBCULTURES
The term “culture” is loaded with multiple and ambiguous meanings [35], [49], [86].  In this
paper, I claim “culture” as an operational and heuristic term for the purpose of categorizing a
specific set of empirical phenomena.  As has been done elsewhere [75], [76], “culture” is used
here to describe those cognitive phenomena — perceptions, experience, beliefs and values —
that are nurtured within occupational groups and guide behavior, judgment, and aesthetics.
Culture thus characterizes ways of understanding how a technical system works, interpreting its
purpose and goals, defining problems, generating solutions, and identifying general rules for
action.  In this sense, culture can be understood as an adaptation to the problems and pressures
faced when working in a particular context.
Clearly, every industry has its own collective culture, and one could describe the “culture
of electric utilities” as compared to other industries or types of organizations.  For example,
utilities in general might be characterized as risk-averse and dedicated to serving their customers.
But for the present purpose, I adopt a differentiation perspective [44], focusing on the distinct
identifiable cultures within the industry and within individual firms.  These cultures are
distinguished by the different relationships people have to power system technology: how they
interact with the system, what problems they are responsible to address, what type of expertise
they depend on, and how, as a result, they interpret the individual technologies and the power
system as a whole.
The two major subcultures that have been observed in the settings of power plants [62],
[72] and power distribution can be labeled as “operators” and “engineers.”  These terms are used
here to typify two distinct ways of relating to the technology.  Operators generally work more
closely and hands-on with the hardware, engaging with it in practice and real-time, while
engineers generally work in the more theoretical areas of design and analysis.  Based on this
typification, I will distinguish “operator” and “engineering” views of power systems and
automation technology.  Though my characterization draws primarily upon interviews with
utility engineers and operators, some evidence suggests that the operator-engineer distinction is,
in fact, a more general phenomenon that is not unique to the utility industry, but occurs in other
technical settings such as manufacturing [73], [88] or aviation [3], [33].
It is important to emphasize that the boundaries of these cultural groups may not coincide
perfectly with departmental boundaries or formal occupational titles held by individuals.  The
present definition of operator and engineering cultures primarily has to do with how a person
thinks, which is functionally related to their job, but not by definition congruent with it.  For
example, an individual might hold an engineering degree but, as a result of their particular
experience, identify to a greater or lesser extent with operator culture.
Although the distinction of operating versus engineering cultures is necessarily somewhat
simplified, it retains the critical aspects of their identity and their substantive conflict.  Most
important, it continued to be validated empirically: there is sufficient coincidence of the
cognitive aspects with the labels that the categorization was immediately meaningful to every
organizational participant who was presented with it.1 
IV. ENGINEERING CULTURE
Many readers will be intimately familiar with the activities and modeling frameworks of
engineering.  Obviously, “engineering” encompasses a great variety of specific job tasks.
Engineers make design drawings, calculate specifications, select components, evaluate
performance, and analyze problems.  Their work has an important idealistic aspect, finding
innovative solutions and always striving to improve things [24], [39], [73].  Some utility
engineers are directly engaged with the physical hardware (for example, overseeing its
                                                 
1 For example, when confronted with a statement such as, “It seems that engineers see it like this...,”
informants would nod in agreement or elaborate on the viewpoint in question, rather than question the category or the
generalization. 
installation); others work with abstract models of the power system (for example, power flow
analysis) or on its indirect aspects (for example, instrumentation or computer systems).  Those
engineers whose work is more remote from the field and of a more academic nature best match
the archetype of this description.  
A. Cognitive Representation
In the engineering framework, “the system” is considered as a composite of individual pieces,
since these are the units that are readily described, understood and manipulated.  The functioning
of the system as a whole is understood as the result of the functioning of these individual
components: should the system not work, the obvious first step is to ask which component failed.
Engineering is therefore analytic, not only in the colloquial sense of investigating a complex
thing, but analytic in the very literal sense of “taking apart,” or treating something in terms of its
separate elements.
Like any analytic process, engineering requires modeling, or representing the actual
physical system in abstracted and appropriately simplified terms that can be understood and
manipulated.  Abstraction and simplification also requires that the system elements be somehow
idealized: each element is represented with its most important characteristics, and only those
characteristics, intact.  An engineering model will thus tend to consider system components in
terms of their specified design parameters and functions.  Each component is assumed to work as
it should; components with identical specifications are assumed to be identical.  Similarly, the
relationships among components are idealized in that only the most important or obvious paths
of interaction (generally the intended paths) are incorporated into the model.  The parameters
describing components and their interactions are thought of as essentially time-invariant, and
invariant with respect to conditions not explicitly linked to these parameters [79].
The behavior of the system is thus abstracted and described in terms of formal rules,
derived from the idealized component characteristics and interactions.  These rules, combined
with information about initial conditions, make the system predictable: from the engineering
point of view, it should be possible in principle to know exactly what the system will do at any
point in the future, as long as all rules and boundary conditions are known with sufficient
accuracy.  These rules also imply a well-understood causality: it is assumed that things happen if
and only if there is a reason for them to happen.  Of course, engineers know that there are
random and unpredictable events, but in order to design and build a technical system, it is
essential to be able to understand and interpret its behavior in terms of cause-and-effect
relationships.  Chains of causality are generally hierarchical, as in if-then decision-making
systems.  Stochasticity is relegated to well-delimited problem areas that are approached with
probabilistic analysis [31]. 
In summary, then, the classic engineering representation of a technical system can be
characterized as abstract, analytic, formal, and deterministic.  
B. Criteria and Expectations
The most important, overarching performance criteria of technical systems in general can be
summarized as efficiency, reliability, and safety.  These general goals tend to be shared widely
and across sub-cultures throughout an organization managing such a system.  However,
individuals or groups may hold different interpretations of what these general goals mean in
practice, or how they can best be realized.  Accordingly, they will also have different
expectations regarding the promise of particular innovations.
When there are trade-offs among safety, reliability, and efficiency, cultural groups may
also emphasize different concerns, not only because they have different priorities, but because
they have different perceptions of how well various criteria are currently being met.  In the
academic engineering context, it is often assumed that certain standards of safety and reliability
have already been achieved, and the creative emphasis is placed on improving efficiency.  In the
case of power systems, safety and reliability are problems that were academically solved a long
time ago, whereas new approaches to increase efficiency offer continuing intellectual challenge.  
The efficiency criterion thus takes a special place in engineering.  Efficiency here can be
taken in its specific energy-related sense as the ratio of energy or kilowatt-hour output to energy
input, or in a more general sense as the relationship of output, production or benefit to input,
materials, effort or cost.  Efficiency is often a direct performance criterion in that its numerator
and denominator are crucial variables of interest that appear on the company's “bottom line” (for
example, electric generation and revenues).  Even where efficiency measures something more
limited or obscure (for example, how many man-hours are required for service restoration), a
more efficient system will generally be able to deliver higher performance at less cost while
meeting the applicable constraints.  Conversely, low efficiency indicates waste, or the presence
of imperfections that motivate further engineering.  A more efficient system will also be
considered more elegant: beyond all its practical implications, efficiency is an aesthetic criterion.
In addition, there is a set of indirect or supporting criteria which, according to the
cognitive framework of engineering, advance efficiency as well as safety and reliability.  While
these criteria may be taken as qualitative standards for the system as a whole, they also apply in
evaluating technological innovations and judging their promise.  One such criterion is speed.  It
is an indirect criterion because it does not represent an actual need or an immediate, measurable
benefit.  However, the speed of various system functions offers some indication of how well the
system is theoretically able or likely to succeed in being efficient.  Generally, a system that
operates faster will involve less waste.  For example, restoring service more quickly means less
waste of time, man-hours, and potential revenues.  Responding and adapting to changes faster
can also mean higher efficiency in terms of improved service quality or saved energy.  Given the
choice between a slow and a fast-operating device, all else being equal, most engineers would
tend to prefer the faster one.  
Similarly, precision is generally considered desirable in engineering culture.  Actually,
the desired criterion is accuracy: not only should information be given with a high level of detail,
but it should be known to be correct to that level.  Accurate measurements of system variables
allow for less waste and thus support efficiency; they also further safe and reliable operation.
However, the accuracy of a given piece of data is not known a priori and is subject to external
disturbances, while its degree of precision is obvious and inherent in design (e.g. the number of
significant figures on a digital readout).  Precision can be chosen; accuracy cannot.  Though
precision does not guarantee accuracy, it at least provides for the possibility of accuracy and is
therefore often taken in its place (and sometimes confused).  Given the choice between a less and
a more precise indicator of system parameters or variables, most engineers would prefer the
more precise one.
More fundamentally, information in and of itself is desirable.  Generally, the more
information is available, the better the system can be optimized, and information can in many
ways advance safety and reliability as well.  In the event that there are excess data that cannot be
used for the purpose at hand, the cost to an engineer of discarding these data is typically very
low: skipping a page, scrolling down a screen or ignoring a number is no trouble in most
engineering work.  In selecting hardware or software applications, all else being equal, most
engineers would prefer those offering more information.
Finally, the ability to control a system and its parts is another indication of how
successfully the system can be engineered, managed, and optimized.  This is because any
variable that can be manipulated can also, in principle, be improved.  As with information, in the
engineering context, there is hardly such a thing as too much control.  If the ability to control
something is available but not needed, the engineer can simply ignore it.  Most engineers would
prefer to design systems and choose components that are controllable to a higher degree.
This set of criteria suggests a general direction for technological innovations that would
be considered desirable and expected to perform well.  Specifically, from the viewpoint of
engineering, innovations that offer increased operational speed, precision, information and
control appear as likely candidates to further the overall system goals of efficiency, reliability,
and safety.  While such expectations are quite logical given the representational framework of
engineering, we will see that the perspective of operations yields a different picture.
V. OPERATOR CULTURE
Operators of technical systems, be they power plants, airplanes or air traffic control, must keep
the system working in real-time.  In electric power distribution, operators monitor and direct
ongoing reconfigurations of their system of interconnected power lines and components from
switching stations and in the field.  Unlike engineering, where the object is to optimize
performance, the goal in operations is to maintain the system in a state of equilibrium or
homœostasis in the face of external disturbances, steering clear of calamities.  An operating
success is to operate without incident.  Depending on the particular system, maintaining such an
equilibrium may be more or less difficult, and the consequences of failure more or less severe.
Three types of challenges are generally characteristic of the operations job: external
influences, clustering of events, and uncertainties in real-time system status.  In the case of
distribution systems, a large part of the hardware is physically accessible and vulnerable to all
kinds of disturbances, whether they are automobiles crashing into poles or foxes electrocuting
themselves on substation circuit breakers.  Events like heavy storms or extreme loading
conditions entail cascading effects in the system and require a large number of switching,
diagnostic and repair operations to be coordinated and carried out under time pressure.  At the
same time, system parameters such as loading status for certain areas or even hardware
capabilities are often not exactly known in real-time.  Distribution operators are quite
accustomed to working in this sort of situation, and the cognitive representation they favor, as
well as their values and criteria for system performance, can be seen as specific adaptations to
these challenges.  
A. Cognitive Representation
In contrast to the engineering representation, which was described as abstract, analytical, formal,
and deterministic, the operator representation of a technical system can be typified as physical,
holistic, empirical, and fuzzy.  This representation is instrumental to operators in two important
ways: it lends itself to maintaining an acute situational awareness, and it supports the use of
intuitive reasoning.
Because operations involve much more immediate contact with the hardware, system
components are imagined as the real, physical artifacts in the way that they are perceived through
all the senses [8], [84].  For example, a particular overhead distribution switch has a certain
dimension, offers a certain resistance to being moved, makes a certain noise and shakes the pole
in a certain way as it closes.  Even when looking at abstract depictions of these artifacts on a
drawing or a computer screen, operators “see” the real thing behind the picture.  With all its
physical properties considered, each artifact has much more of a unique individuality than its
abstract representation would suggest: one transformer may overheat more than another of the
same rating, or one relay may trip slightly faster than another at the same setting.  Thus,
components that look the same on a drawing aren't necessarily identical to an operator.
To be sure, operators must also work with abstract representations.  For distribution
operators, this means primarily circuit maps and schematic diagrams for switching.  It is
interesting to note, though, that the abstractions they find useful and transparent are, to them,
significantly different from those abstractions preferred by engineers.  For example, some
operators were presented with a wall map of their jurisdiction designed by the company's
engineering department.  They found it unusable, saying it resembled “a piping diagram of [a
nuclear power plant].”2  While good maps for engineers are those that do a thorough job of
depicting selected objects and their formal relationships, the most useful maps for experienced
operators are those that most effectively recall their physical image of the territory.
Another aspect of operators' cognitive representation is that they conceptualize the
system more as a whole than in terms of individual pieces.  Rather than considering the
interactions among components as individual pathways that can be isolated, the classic operator
model is of one entire network phenomenon.  Every action taken somewhere must be assumed to
have repercussions elsewhere in the system, even if no direct interaction mechanism is known or
understood.  This is consistent with operators' experience, where they are often confronted with
unanticipated or unexplained interactions throughout the system.
Rather than using formal rules to predict system behavior, operators rely primarily on a
phenomenological understanding of the system, based on empirical observation.  The underlying
notion is that no amount of rules and data can completely and reliably capture the actual
complexity of the system.  Therefore, though one can make some good guesses, one cannot
really know what will happen until one has seen it happen.  No component can be expected to
function according to its specifications until it has been proven to do so, and the effect of any
modification has to be demonstrated to be believed.  While engineers would tend to assume that
something will work according to the rules, even if it didn't in the past, operators expect that it
will work the way it did in the past, even if analysis suggests otherwise.  Many arguments
between engineers and operators can be traced to this fundamental difference in reasoning.
Finally, the operator representation is one that expects uncertainty rather than
deterministic outcomes.  Whether due to the physical characteristics of the system, insufficiency
of available data, lack of a complete understanding of the system, or simply external influences,
uncertainty or “fuzziness” is taken to be inevitable and, to some degree, omnipresent. 
                                                 
2 The comparison is noteworthy because an analogous difference in cognitive representations was found
among nuclear engineers and operators who refer to different mental maps when explaining or trouble-
shooting a power plant [62].  While nuclear operators would find a piping diagram comprehensible and
informative, they prefer to visualize the physical plant as they have come to know it through inspection
up-close, which for some meant actually crawling through the pipes before their plant was first brought
on-line.
Ambiguity, rather than being subject to confinement, is seen to pervade the entire system, and
operators suspect the unsuspected at every turn.  
Overall, this cognitive representation was poignantly summarized by an operator who
described his distribution system as a “live, undulating organism” that must somehow be
managed.  This physical, holistic, empirical and fuzzy view of the system is adaptive to the
challenge of operating the system in real-time in that it allows one to quickly condense a vast
spectrum of information, including gaps and data pieces with different degrees of uncertainty,
into an overall impression or gestalt that can be consulted with relative confidence to guide
immediate action.
  The cultivation of a reference map of a complex set of events in real-time has been
recognized as a key aspect of operation in other settings.  In the cognitive literature, the
phenomenon is called “situational awareness” [23], [30].  On Navy aircraft carriers, it is referred
to as “having the bubble” [59], [60].  Here the combat duty officer must visualize what is going
on in the multiple operational sectors he coordinates — undersea, surface ships, aircraft and
missile operations — and integrate these diverse inputs into a single picture of the ship's overall
situation.  In this case, it is literally a three-dimensional bubble of awareness that the officer is
responsible for comprehending.  The concept is also recognized by civilian air traffic controllers,
who must keep in mind every aircraft present in the airspace, its speed, and trajectory.  In
distribution systems, the status of the system with all its open and closed switches and the
loading conditions on various components must be kept in mind and continuously updated by the
operator.  In all of these cases, maintaining a “bubble” of spatial and temporal awareness enables
the operator to anticipate the consequences of operating actions and recognize imminent failures.
Though the consequences of errors in distribution switching tend to be of smaller proportion than
airplane crashes, the safety and reliability of the system still critically depends on operators
“having the bubble.”
Finally, operators tend to draw on intuitive reasoning, especially when data are
insufficient but action is required nonetheless.  Though there are manuals specifying operating
procedures, many situations occur that could not have been foreseen in detail and courses of
action recommended.  To deal with the problem at hand, analytic tools may not be able to
provide answers quickly enough.  Worse yet, information on the books may be found
untrustworthy under the circumstances — for example, if recent data appear to contradict what
was thought to be known about the system.  In order to come to a quick decision, the operator's
main recourse then is to recall past experience with similar situations.  How did the system
behave then?  Were people surprised?  How did the particular equipment respond?  Based on
such experience, an operator will have an intuitive “feel” for the likelihood of success of a given
procedure.
This experience-based approach is intuitive not because it is irrational, but because it is
non-algorithmic.  An operator might have difficulty articulating all the factors taken into
consideration for such a decision, and how, precisely, they were mentally weighed and
combined.  He or she might not be able to cite the reasons for feeling that something will work,
or not work.  Nonetheless, the decision makes use of factual data and logical cause-effect
relationships, as they have been empirically observed.  
The use of intuitive processes is so deeply embodied in the culture of operations that they
are often chosen over analytic approaches by preference rather than necessity.  Obviously, both
methods can fail; the question is about relative degrees of confidence.  While engineers may
frown on operator justifications that seem based on intractable, obscure logic or even
superstition, operators delight in offering accounts of situations where their intuition turned out
to be more accurate than an engineer's prediction.  In fact, both approaches are adaptive to the
work contexts of their proponents, and while both have a certain validity, either approach may
turn out to yield better results in a given situation.  The important point here is that substantive
differences in cognitive representations and reasoning modes underlie what may appear to be
trivial conflicts or petty competition between cultural groups, and that these differences will also
have specific implications for the evaluation of technological innovations.
B. Criteria and Expectations
Of the three general system criteria — safety, reliability, and efficiency — safety takes a special
priority in operations, while efficiency is less of a tangible concern.  From the point of view of
managing the system in real-time, efficiency is an artifact of analysis and evaluation: a number
tagged on after the fact, having little to do with reality as it presents itself here and now.  Though
it may indicate operating success, efficiency more directly measures the performance of
engineers.  Most operators would agree that having an efficient system is nice, as long as it
doesn't interfere with their job. 
Safety, on the other hand, takes on a profoundly tangible meaning for operators because
the consequences of errors face them with such immediacy.  In power distribution, any single
operation, performed at the wrong time, has the potential to cause customers to lose power.
Immediately, telephones will ring, voices on the other end will shout and complain, and the
control room may even fill with anxious supervisors.  Because of the interdependence of power
system components, the consequences may occur on a much larger scale than the initial error.
Aside from causing power outages, incorrect switching operations can damage utility and
customer equipment.  
But even more serious is the risk of injury or electrocution, whether of utility crews or
others who are accidentally in contact with equipment (for example, people in a car under
downed lines).  The one action operators dread most is to energize a piece of equipment in the
course of switching operations that is still touching a person.  Like operators of other technical
systems, distribution operators carry a personal burden of responsibility for injuries or fatalities
during their shift that goes far beyond their legal or procedural accountability.  The difference
between an intellectual recognition and the direct experience of the hazards cannot be
overemphasized: hearing an accident described is not the same as watching one's buddy die in a
flash of sparks a few feet away.  Such incidents are sufficiently frequent that in every shift of
distribution operators interviewed during this research, at least one individual had either
witnessed or been partially responsible for a death or severe injury.  The awareness of the life-
taking potential of distribution system operation is thus in some sense omnipresent in the control
room and implicitly or explicitly enters any decision made there, whether about day-to-day
operations or about implementing new technology.
Their acute perception of safety colors operators' interpretation of other system goals and
helps define their criteria for good system design and performance.  The set of criteria — speed,
precision, information, and control —  which, from the engineering perspective, support not only
efficiency but also safety and reliability may be seen by operators as less important or even
counterproductive.  Instead, operators value a different set of criteria that specifically support
their ability to operate the system safely.
Speed, generally advantageous in engineering, is more problematic in operations because
one is working in real-time.  Speed is desired by operators in the context of obtaining
information.  They may also wish for their actions to be executable quickly, so as to gain
flexibility in coordinating operations.  However, a system of fast-responding components and
quickly-executed operating procedures, where effects of actions propagate faster and perhaps
farther, also introduces problems: it will tend to be less tractable for the operator, provide less
time to observe and evaluate events and think in between actions, and allow problems to become
more severe before they can be corrected.  Power systems are inherently fast in that electric
effects and disturbances propagate at the speed of light, making cascades of trips and blackouts
almost instantaneous.  Any delays or buffering of such effects work toward the operator's
benefit.  Thus, from the perspective of operations, stability is generally more desirable than
speed.  Operators would prefer a system that predictably remains in its state, or moves from
equilibrium only slowly, allowing for a greater chance to intervene and bring it back into
balance.
Information can also be problematic in the context of operations.  To be sure, there are
many examples of information that distribution operators say they wish they had, or had more of.
But more is not always better.  Because one is gathering information and acting upon it in real-
time, the cost of discarding irrelevant information is not negligible.  Deciding which data are
important and which are not costs time and mental effort; superfluous data may distract from
what is critical.  Specifically, too much data may interfere with “the bubble.”3  Distribution
operators often give examples of information overload: many computer screens that must be
scanned for a few relevant messages, or many pages of printout reporting on a single outage
event.  Generally, instead of greater quantity of information, operators desire transparency,
meaning that the available information is readily interpreted and placed into context.  It is more
important for them to maintain an overview of the behavior of the whole system than to have
detailed knowledge about its components: in terms of maintaining situational awareness, it is
preferable to lack a data point than to be confused about the big picture even for an instant.  If
more information has the potential to create confusion, then for operators it is bad.
Similarly, more precision is not always better for operators.  While engineers can make
use of numbers with many significant figures, the last decimal places are probably not useful for
guiding operating decisions.  In fact, operator culture fosters a certain skepticism of any
information, especially quantitative.  This skepticism is consistent with their keen awareness of
the possibility of foul-ups like mistaking one number for another, misplacing a decimal point, or
trusting a faulty instrument, and the grave potential consequences.4  Therefore, operators' primary
and explicit concern about any given numerical datum is whether it basically tells the true story,
not how well it tells it.  Moreover, precision can be distracting or even misleading, suggesting
greater accuracy than is in fact given.  Thus, in operations, veracity of information is emphasized
over precision.  Rather than trusting a precise piece of information and running the chance of it
being wrong, operators would generally prefer to base decisions on a reliable confidence
interval, even if it is wide.
                                                 
3 An interesting example from a different setting is Perby's account of weather forecasters in Sweden [53], who
rely largely on experience and intuitive, “operator-type” reasoning.  It was found that augmenting the forecasters'
intuitive approach with computer data and processing lowered the quality of the forecasts.  Perby concludes that
“increased information ... does not mean greater reliability in decision-making.”
4 The events leading up to the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island are a classic example [69].
Finally, more control is not always better.  Of course, there may be variables over which
operators wish they had more control.  But the crucial difference is that in engineering, control
always represents an option, whereas in operations there may be an associated responsibility to
exercise this control: the ability to control a variable can create the expectation that it should be
controlled, and produce pressure to act.  Operators tend to be wary of such pressure, primarily
because it runs counter to a basic attitude of conservatism fostered by their culture: “When in
doubt, don't touch anything.”5  Their reluctance to take any action unless it is clearly necessary
arises from the awareness that any operation represents a potential error, with potentially severe
consequences.  An interventionist approach that may allow greater optimization and fine-tuning
thus inherently threatens what they see as their mission, namely, to avoid calamities.
In pragmatic terms, more controlling options may mean that operators have more to do
and keep in mind, and thereby increase stress levels.  Alternatively, they may not have time to
exercise the control at all, in which case their performance will be implicitly devalued by the
increased expectation.  Because time and attention are limited resources in operations, and
because of the potential for error associated with any action, the option not to control can be
more desirable than the ability to control.  This option is provided by a system's robustness, or its
tendency to stay in a viable equilibrium by itself.  
In summary, then, the system qualities that are most important for operators are stability,
transparency, veracity, and robustness, which support them in their task of keeping the system in
homœostasis.  Not coincidentally, these criteria are generally associated with older technologies,
designed and built in an era where operability was viewed as more of a firm constraint than
material resources.  In the case of power distribution systems, stability and robustness have been
provided largely by oversized equipment and redundancy of components, while transparency and
veracity were furnished through simple mechanical and analog instrumentation and controls.
From the viewpoint of increasing the efficiency of such systems in today's world, process
innovations guided by engineering criteria may be desirable indeed.  From the operations
perspective, however, such innovations may be expected to adversely affect performance
reliability and especially safety.  Thus, when steps are proposed toward more refined and
sophisticated system operation, operators may identify potential backlash effects, in which
opportunities for system improvement also introduce new vulnerabilities.  
VI. THE CASE OF DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATION
This research focused primarily on two specific approaches to automating power distribution
systems.  The first involves the remote operation of switches to reconfigure the topology of
distribution circuits, along with increased monitoring of circuit data.  This technology is known
as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).  It implies a transition from operating
through field personnel (communicating via telephone or radio) to directly accessing the system
via a computer terminal in the control room.  This has already been implemented on various
scales by U.S. utilities over the past two decades, though it has not reached a majority of
distribution systems.  The second, more radical or comprehensive approach is operation through
expert systems that either recommend actions to the operator (open-loop) or execute them as well
(closed-loop).  The use of expert systems in power distribution is still experimental and quite
limited. 
                                                 
5 Different variations of this motto were stated by several operators.
The motivation for distribution automation is a straightforward application of engineering
criteria.  Remote control vastly increases operational speed, since personnel no longer need to
physically travel to sequences of field locations.  Aside from the more efficient use of man-
hours, increased speed of switching operations implies faster service restoration times after
power outages.  In addition, SCADA provides more information and greater precision of
knowledge about the system status.  The shorter time scale of switching, especially if SCADA is
augmented with “intelligence,” also introduces new options to reconfigure circuits for purposes
of increasing efficiency.  This can be accomplished by reducing electric losses (through
equalizing loads on different circuits), or by enhancing the utilization of assets (through
redistributing load at different times so as to get maximal use out of existing equipment).  These
strategies are known as “load balancing,” and along with very rapid automated service
restoration, they motivate the development of expert systems for power distribution applications.
The engineering literature contains many enthusiastic projections of potential savings and
performance improvements by means of these techniques [1], [17], [28], [34], [47], [66], [67].
Among distribution operators, however, the enthusiasm for automation tends to be
modest and declines with increasing sophistication of the proposed innovations.  While many
operators report favorable experiences with SCADA and are quick to point out its advantages,
each implementation of SCADA surveyed also met with some degree of resistance, and critiques
are still offered by operations staff.  The main points of concern relate to safety and the
operators’ ability to maintain an accurate situational awareness.  Without issuing orders over the
phone and waiting while they are carried out by someone in the field, time is suddenly
compressed.  Thus, one operator commented,
It used to be that you had time to think between switching things.  Now you don’t have time to
think.
and another described an error he had committed recently:
It was an embarrassing thing – my fingers were faster than my mind.  I thought I had opened a
switch, but I hadn’t...
At the same time, the redundancy of a second person reviewing the steps is eliminated.  Less
reliance on field crews also means fewer first-hand reports from physical inspection of the
equipment that might indicate any abnormalities or developing damage early on.  Furthermore,
silent interaction with computer terminals reduces the ability of a team of operators in the control
room to remain aware of each other's activities and coordinate them.  In effect, SCADA imposes
on operators an engineering representation of the system that takes components to be readily
parameterized and well-behaved, while reducing the opportunity to collectively construct an
operator’s view of the “beast.”
Perhaps most dauntingly, operators have to trust their computer screen to tell them
whether a switch is open or closed, potentially a matter of life or death for the field crews.  Thus
it is not uncommon for operations staff to insist on verifying the operation of SCADA-controlled
equipment on location, or even choose to control it manually instead.  For example, operators at
one utility said,  
We had a guy who, three years after SCADA was installed, sent someone out to the substation to
operate the switch.
Finally, given the greater ability to respond to inefficiencies in the system, operators feel
pressured at times to take actions that they would prefer to avoid for reasons of safety and
minimizing error potential.  One supervisor recounted his experience of the first year after
SCADA was introduced by his company:
The data was scrutinized as though one must act on it immediately.  The people from [the superior
administrative office] called to say, you have to relieve this switch and that... In the second year, I
told the staff to ignore them.
As a result of the above concerns, even when SCADA technology is successfully installed,
operators often choose not to make full use of the available capabilities, and thereby compromise
the anticipated efficiency gains. 
With respect to expert systems, operators raise more ardent objections that can be
expected to lead to significant conflicts when such technologies are actually installed.  The
primary contention is that the knowledge required to operate the system well can ultimately not
be formalized.  One problem is the need to respond flexibly to external influences of an
unpredictable nature, or such information as cannot be readily integrated into a computer
program.  One operator argued,
What if something goes wrong?  What if a line is down, jumping around, and the fault current
isn’t high enough to trip [a circuit breaker]?  The computer has no idea...
and another explained,
There are so many contingencies that you can’t program into a computer – say, the East Bay
firestorm.  Or I want to test a circuit and there’s a van with six kids under it.  Or talking to the fire
department... You want a person doing these things.
Another, related problem is the accurate maintenance of a vast database on system
characteristics, some of which defy formal categorization, such as the actual quality of a
particular conductor or splice:
You may have a piece of wire that’s a smaller size, because they ran out.  So you know you can’t
load it the same.  But the computer doesn’t know that.
Another operator claimed,
Based on my 25 years of utility experience, I know that a database is never more than 85%
accurate and updated.  So you can’t let the computer do things. 
Operators also contend that a system programmed to go “by the book” would be less successful
at rescuing seemingly hopeless situations through improvisation.  For example, an operator
described an action that, he claimed, saved thousands of customers from a power outage:
One operator recently switched in these two [transformer] banks.  A computer would never have
done that because it was too risky.  It wasn’t by the book, but the guy knew that it would be okay.
In the long run, they are concerned about loss of skill and the problem of having to take over in
case of a computer failure, without regular practice.6  Though it is often argued that automating
control processes frees up operators' time and attention, systems designed in this way tend to
depend on active intervention, and the operators remain responsible to take over this task should
any part of the automation fail.  As a retired operations supervisor commented,
If there’s an emergency, and you’re the guy who’s been studying it all year and you have a feeling
for it, you probably know how to deal with the emergency.  If it’s all automated and you have an
emergency, you’re standing there with your face hanging down wondering what you’re supposed
to be doing.
Particularly new operators would miss the opportunity to develop an experience-based mental
map of the system.  
Finally, automation may allow systems to become so complex and demanding in their
operation that they are no longer transparent in real-time to any human, in which case the
computer must be relied upon completely.  Some engineers argue, for instance, that
...the restoration task may prove unmanageable for an operator not aided by some kind of tool.
Herein lies the importance of an expert system implemented on a computer [1, p.101].
                                                 
6 This problem is well-recognized in the context of aviation [3], [33], [70]. 
Because of the discrepancies between abstracted models and the physical system they routinely
experience, operators fundamentally distrust the notion of computers making real, consequential
decisions.  Using a popular operator metaphor for the human brain, one supervisor said, 
Don’t get me wrong – I love computers.  But for these decisions, the old carbon-based unit is still
superior.
In U.S. utilities that are implementing distribution automation, these reservations on the
part of operators have resulted in delays, reductions of scope, or even abandonment of
automation projects.  Their resistance can manifest either as verbal or as behavioral opposition to
proposed operating techniques.  Specifically, operators may choose to execute controls manually
rather than remotely, refrain from undertaking certain switching procedures, disregard
recommendations by expert systems, or override a closed-loop mode of operation.  In one
instance, a leading engineer summed up that his company's ambitious demonstration program
was essentially abandoned because of “attitude problems” in the operations department.  Even in
cases where automation is continually being implemented and expanded, it appears that such
resistance has led to modified application and thus diminished economic returns compared to
initial projections.  The evolution of distribution automation is therefore inevitably impacted by
cultural conflict.
VII. DISCUSSION
Disagreement between occupational groups as described here tends to be well-recognized among
practitioners in technical industries, even if it receives little explicit mention in public forums
such as the technical literature or discussions of corporate policy with respect to technological
change.  In conversation, operators, engineers, and managers alike acknowledge these
differences of opinion and even point out their importance for the fate of innovations.  Why,
then, is cultural conflict not a more common topic?
One might surmise that a fear of what could be seen as corporate embarrassment would
motivate managers to minimize these conflicts in public.  On a deeper level, though, there are
two important misunderstandings that may lead anyone to dismiss the core problem as either
intellectually trivial or hopeless to resolve in practice, and therefore not worthy of explicit study.
These misunderstandings are (1) that evaluations of technology are determined only by facts, and
(2) that cultural groups have inherently subjective or irrational biases.
In the first case, one would argue that differences of opinion arise mainly because people
do not have uniform access to the same objective information.  This assumption is made, for
instance, by those engineers who argue that operators who object to innovations do so mainly
because they are unaware or misinformed about the actual capabilities of state-of-the-art
technology.  In principle, then, conflicts could be resolved by education: once everyone has all
the facts straight, they will agree on the most reasonable course of action.  However, while
education is surely important for fostering cooperation and productive discussions, I would argue
that some important perceptual differences will always remain, even in a scenario of perfect
information.  This is because the root of the differences lies not in fact, but in representation.
Consider the example of safety in automated distribution switching.  An engineer might
cite the specifications and performance record of a particular control mechanism and assert that it
meets all standards for reliable operation.  Yet an operator, having never used the mechanism,
might reject the technology based on a hypothetical failure scenario: what if this mechanism
closed the switch, but electronically indicated an “open” position?  The conflict here is not just
about the facts: even if the exact failure probability of the mechanism were known, the conflict
would persist.  Nor is the argument necessarily about different standards of safety.  More
fundamentally, the difference lies in the modality of reasoning: the engineer is convinced by
abstract analysis, whereas the operator trusts only direct experience.  Thus, the operator will
remain unimpressed even by superior safety characteristics as shown on paper, until the
innovation has been observed under the precise applicable circumstances for a period of time.
Specifically, the operator may raise concerns about failure modes that fall outside the scope of
analysis, based on other experiences which the engineer, in turn, might argue to be technically
unrelated.  The essence of the disagreement, therefore, is not about how safe automated
switching actually is, but about how one knows that it is safe.
The second misunderstanding of cultural conflict is to attribute it entirely to pre-existing
and irreconcilable differences of a subjective and non-rational nature.  Thus, an operator's
objections to an innovation might simply be explained by saying that operators are generally old-
fashioned, afraid of the unknown, and prejudiced against computers.  Conversely, an innovation
proposal might be seen as just another product of unrestrained engineering creativity, serving no
practical purpose other than to satisfy the engineers' relentless appetite for tinkering and
hypothetical optimization games.  A related interpretation is that operators and engineers simply
act in their own self-interest as occupational groups.  Here one would suspect that operators only
object to innovation because it threatens their status or job security, whereas engineers advocate
innovations only to bolster their own position or self-image.  If the above assertions are true, then
any attempts to resolve these differences by intellectual argument are bound to fail.  Indeed, not
few senior practitioners in the utility industry seem to agree with this conclusion and see the
retirement of an entire generation of operations staff as the only possible end to the conflict about
automation.
  Yet I argue that cultural differences can also be understood in a constructive way that
unifies the picture, while granting each perspective its own validity.  The point is that opinions
about technological innovations, however contradictory or self-serving they might appear, can be
explained as rational consequences of cognitive representations and reasoning modes appropriate
to specific contexts.  Thus we might say that a view of technology is contextually rational
because it follows in a logical and internally consistent manner from certain assumptions, which
are in turn logical assumptions to make within a given work context. 
Specifically, the respective cognitive representations used by engineers and operators
give rise to different ideas about what system modifications may be desirable, and divergent
expectations for the performance of innovations.  If one imagines a technical system in terms of
an abstraction in which interactions among components are governed deterministically by formal
and tractable rules, then (1) these formal relationships suggest ways of modifying individual
system parameters so as to alter system performance in a predictable fashion according to desired
criteria, and (2) it is credible that such modifications will succeed according to a priori analysis
of their impacts on the system.  From this point of view, automation holds positive promise and
little risk.  On the other hand, if one imagines the system as an animated entity with uncertainties
that can never be completely isolated and whose behavior can be only approximately understood
through close familiarity, then (1) modifications are inherently less attractive because they may
compromise the tractability and predictability of the system, and (2) any innovation must be
suspected of having unanticipated and possibly adverse consequences.  From this point of view,
automation implies the attempt to squeeze the system into a conceptual mold that it may not fit –
treating an animal like a simple machine – and thus harbors the potential for disaster.
The notion of contextual rationality not only grants both sides an intellectual legitimacy,
it also provides that conflicting views can be motivated not by conflicting interests, but by shared
concerns about the fate of the technical system.7  Thus engineers and operators alike wish for the
system to be efficient, safe, and reliable, notwithstanding their different interpretations of what
these goals mean in practice and how they can best be achieved.  Indeed, the electric utility
industry has historically placed great emphasis on cultivating a sense of personal commitment
toward the well-being of the system among its employees, shaping what is still generally
experienced as “utility culture.”  No explanation of behavior and discourse in this setting could
be complete without accounting for this phenomenon.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT
The problem of cultural conflict as characterized in this paper has two important implications for
management, namely (1) that addressing the conflict in some manner is inevitable, and (2) that
such conflict can, in some ways, be considered an asset rather than a liability to an organization.
When management deems technological innovation desirable but operations staff resist it,
one possible approach is to attempt to minimize the impacts of this resistance.  In the short run,
this may be done by circumventing operators in the decision-making process.  However, if
technologies are implemented that conflict with operators' values and concerns, they may
compromise the results through selective use or non-use of the installed capabilities [41].  For the
long run, then, strategies may be devised that reduce operators' discretion and ability to influence
outcomes, or even replace human operators entirely by expert systems.  
This approach bears an obvious risk: What if operator knowledge and skills are indeed
important to the successful operation of the system?  What does it mean to sacrifice the person
who “has the bubble”?  Typically, the actual contribution of operators toward system
performance is not well-known or even measurable for lack of feasible experiment; it can easily
be underestimated.  It is interesting to note that in the context of nuclear plant safety, where
operator actions and their consequences are studied extensively, operators have primarily been
considered as possible initiators of failure sequences [57].  Their positive contribution has been
recognized only quite recently, sparking a new interest in human factors research [80].
Similarly, distribution operators feel that they receive a disproportionate amount of attention for
mishaps as compared to successes.  As automation is implemented, one potential problem is that
errors and coordination problems are attributed to the control retained by human operators,
rather than that which they have given up.  This may lead managers to conclude that more
automation is needed, while in fact events support the validity of operators' warnings.8
The model of contextual rationality suggests that when operators assert the importance of
their experience and discretion, this may not be a purely self-serving claim.  Because their
position can be traced through a logical course of reasoning to a common concern for the fate of
the system, it is plausible to assume that their arguments have some merit and deserve careful
consideration.  Depending on the nature of the particular system, the potential consequences of
system failures due to neglecting the operator perspective may be severe and life-threatening;
                                                 
7 Here we also draw on an integration perspective of organizational culture, according to Martin [44].
8 This phenomenon has been reported in aviation, where failures of highly automated aircraft were diagnosed as
pilot error, to be remedied by further automation [68].
even if not, they may still exceed the cost of adapting the innovation process in response to their
concerns.
Indeed, conflict over innovation could be considered a welcome occasion to explore
diverse views and understandings of technology and their positive contributions to an
organization's goals.  As Van Maanen and Barley have argued [78], deviance from managerial
expectations in organizations has traditionally been considered dysfunctional and its sources
have been ignored, muted, or attributed to factors not substantively related to the work.  Contrary
to this conventional wisdom, however, “willful violation of managerial expectations may also
correspond to a pervasive logic embedded within the historically developed practices of
occupational members doing what they feel they must. ...What is deviant organizationally may
be occupationally correct (and vice versa)” (p.291).
The diversity of “occupationally correct” positions can enhance an organization's
collective technical knowledge and even offers protection against certain failure modes.  Specific
support for this claim comes from the nuclear case, where a common characteristic among
successful plants (i.e., those with excellent safety records and high availability) was found to be
an active and deliberate maintenance and nourishment of cultural diversity among engineers and
operators [62], [64].  This was one striking similarity in a cross-national comparison of plants
with otherwise quite diverse operational and managerial styles [62].  The nurturing attitude
manifested especially in problem-solving situations, where decision-makers drew on the
interpretations of both operators and engineers as having equal status but different perspective,
with participants negotiating which interpretation was more applicable or useful in a particular
situation.  It was felt that cultivating both views offered an insurance against shared
misconceptions about the plant (for example, misjudging the significance of an instrument
reading).  In other words, cognitive diversity may protect organizations against errors of
rendition [58], [81]. 
It is plausible to suppose that if cognitive diversity is valuable in the day-to-day problem
solving, it is also useful in planning and innovation design.  While the scope of the present
research did not include a rigorous evaluation of the performance of distribution automation, the
projects described as the most successful by those involved were those in which the diversity of
views was considered early in the design stage, and where innovations were tailored to the
specific needs and concerns of operators. 
It is also plausible that the dynamics of cultural conflict described here in detail for the
case of power distribution apply in other industries that manage technical systems.  This claim is
supported by the consistency of some important observations in power plant operation, aviation,
air traffic control, and aircraft carrier operations.  It is important that, while some characteristics
of power distribution were described here for illustrative purposes, the core explanation of the
diverse cognitive representations and contextual rationality does not hinge on the particular
details of the technical system or the organization managing it.  The argument of this paper is
also consistent with other authors' accounts of the cultural dynamics surrounding technological
innovation in various industries [73], [88].  Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that
practitioners in other technical settings are no strangers to the type of cultural conflict
characterized here.  
IX. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Based on the case of distribution automation, this paper has illustrated how diverse cognitive
representations of a technological system may give rise to conflicting but contextually rational
assessments of technological process innovation.  One would expect to find representational
diversity in an organization like an electric utility that manages a complex and hazardous
technological system because the technology is too complex for any one person to comprehend
in its entirety across function, space, and time [11], [13].  Knowledge-intensive firms especially
are characterized by 
a process of distributed cognition in which multiple communities of specialized knowledge
workers, each dealing with a part of an organizational problem, interact to create the pattern of
sense making and behavior displayed by the organization as a whole [10].
The notion that such a differentiation of perspectives represents a functional adaptation to such
an organization’s task is underscored by findings that the operator-engineer dichotomy in its
cognitive aspects1 is invariant across national cultures [62].  If, as Weick and Roberts [82]
suggest, “reliable performance may require a well-developed collective mind in the form of a
complex, attentive system tied together by trust,” and “normal accidents2 represent a breakdown
of social processes and comprehension rather than a failure of technology” (p.378), then we must
further conclude that constructive interaction of diverse occupational cultures within such an
organization is vital for its success and, depending on the nature and extent of hazards involved,
for employee and public safety.
The distinct competence of each community is taken here to encompass not only the
substance of what is known, but a distinct epistemology: a way of knowing things, constructing
models, drawing inferences, making predictions, accepting or rejecting courses of action.  Such
different ways of knowing have been described within another specific technical setting by Orr
[52], whose findings about photocopier repair technicians mirror some of those reported here
about operators.  Orr specifically describes the notion of a unique kind of understanding of a
technological system cultivated by repair technicians as opposed to trainers or engineers.  His
research emphasizes that the nature of the technicians’ task demands “tricky interpolations
between abstract accounts and situated demands” based on “bountiful conflicting and confusing
data” [14] and furthermore explores the function of narrative as a way of fixing and preserving
the experiential knowledge needed to deal with this type of situation.  Similarly, Boland and
Tenkasi [11] recognize the importance of two distinct modes of cognition in the organizational
setting, one paradigmatic and one narrative, referring to the distinction introduced by Bruner
[16].  Though a discussion of the explicit use of narrative among distribution operators (which
was indeed observed) is beyond the scope of this paper, the finding that knowledge of a technical
system may be represented in a form that relates to past personal experience on the one hand or
abstract quantities with formal relationships and rule-based behavior on the other is in excellent
agreement with these authors’ propositions.  
What the present work further aims to develop, however, is the relationship between such
ways of knowing and the process of technological change within an organization.  This
connection was established by way of the values and criteria that are consistent with the
respective representations and that become applied to real, practical choices about work and
innovation.  The resulting perspective is one that recognizes subjective epistemology applied to
                                                 
1 Other aspects of the dichotomy that vary across national settings include placement within the formal
organizational chart, educational requirements, dress, and social status.
2 See [54].
matters of objective ontology.  The technological artifacts and processes in question have
objective properties and behaviors, some of them more obvious and others less (say, the failure
probability of a switch), but still unarguably real and factual.  The literature that analyzes the
ramifications of implementing such artifacts and processes, especially with the intention of
informing management decisions, generally addresses these matters in terms of an epistemology
that is similarly objective, inferring consequences or impacts of technological choices through
cause-effect relationships by a method that can be proven right or wrong [1], [15], [17], [34],
[46].  But when we acknowledge different yet equally legitimate ways of making such
inferences, these epistemologies must be labeled subjective by virtue of their non-uniqueness
(there is more than one right way to decide whether the switch is safe).  This would be
unproblematic if one could therefore simply relegate them to the domain of things irrelevant to
rational decision-making (such as whether transformers are beautiful or ugly) and move on.
However subjective, though, these ways of knowing and inferring are inextricably linked to the
very real process by which people design, fix and operate machines.  Thus, in order to gain a
thorough understanding of how technology is chosen and used, it is necessary to adopt a
framework that can account for diverse perspectives simultaneously. 
The need for such an approach is elegantly stated by Czarniawska [20] in the context of
anthropological research in organizations:
The result should be a multifaceted magnifying glass, showing a picture that is wholly visible but fuzzy
from a distance, and that becomes sharp but incomplete when viewed through one of the facets. ...  The
challenge is in presenting the complexity of a situation as it is perceived simultaneously by different
actors (and the researcher), in the hope that this same complexity will help both actors and observers to
understand the reasons and effects of actions undertaken by actors when they are looking through one
facet only.  They see a fairly clear picture, yet do not realize that looking through another facet will
produce a similarly clear but different picture (p.204).
This work argues for extending such an anthropological perspective to the very specific and
applied matters of technology where it has not traditionally had a place.
X. FUTURE RESEARCH
One obvious research task emerging from these findings is to test the categories of operator and
engineering culture for their generality across different technical and organizational settings, to
ascertain whether an important set of characteristics — particularly the core definitions of the
cognitive representations as presented here — remain invariant (as I expect they will).  The next
task would be to examine whether these two cultural categories are associated with similarly
conflicting positions regarding technological innovation in various settings, or in what different
ways the cognitive representations and epistemologies come to bear on practical decisions.  This
approach could also be extended to other occupational or cultural communities.  Finally, the
view of technological innovation, which has been broadened here to explicitly encompass
diversity of perspective at least in a static sense, might be further developed to describe the
dynamics of the change process over time and compared with other coherent theories of the
dynamics of technological change.
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